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Abstract
The current study assessed peripheral responses during decision making under explicit risk, and tested whether
intraindividual variability in choice behavior can be explained by fluctuations in peripheral arousal. Electrodermal
activity (EDA) and heart rate (HR) were monitored in healthy volunteers (N5 68) during the Roulette Betting Task. In
this task, participants were presented with risky gambles to bet on, with the chances of winning varying across trials.
Hierarchical Bayesian analyses demonstrated that EDA and HR acceleration responses during the decision phase were
sensitive to the chances of winning. Interindividual differences in this peripheral reactivity during risky decision
making were related to trait sensitivity to punishment and trait sensitivity to reward. Moreover, trial-by-trial variation
in EDA and HR acceleration responses predicted a small portion of intraindividual variability in betting choices. Our
results show that psychophysiological responses are sensitive to explicit risk and can help explain intraindividual
heterogeneity in choice behavior.
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Deciding between options with uncertain outcomes is a complex
process, and the question of how we choose between different pros-
pects and response options intrigues psychologists and economists
alike. One core insight obtained from recent neuroscience research
is that decision making comprises not only cognitive but also emo-
tional processes (e.g., Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; Damasio,
1994, 1996; Heilman, Cris¸an, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010). For
instance, when making decisions about risky gambles, participants
are unduly biased by the anticipation of regret or envy (negative
emotional states; Coricelli et al., 2005; Coricelli & Rustichini,
2010). Other research has shown that mood manipulations through
exposure to emotional stimuli impact subsequent (unrelated) eco-
nomic decisions, such as the price requested in selling transactions
(Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004) and risk judgments (Johnson
& Tversky, 1983).
Emotional processing can also be investigated via the measure-
ment of peripheral responses (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, &
Lang, 2001; Cuthbert, Bradley, & Lang, 1996; Lang, 1995; Lang &
Davis, 2006). In the field of human decision making, this approach
was pioneered by Bechara and colleagues (Bechara, Damasio, Tra-
nel, & Damasio, 1997), who assessed electrodermal activity (EDA)
during the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Dama-
sio, & Anderson, 1994). In the IGT, players choose between four
card decks associated with different win and loss contingencies.
Two decks are advantageous, yielding a net profit (termed the safe
or good decks); the other two decks deliver a net loss (termed the
risky or bad decks). Bechara et al. (1997) found that EDA is higher
before choices from risky decks than choices from safe decks (for
replications, see, e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999;
Crone, Somsen, Van Beek, & Van Der Molena, 2004; Tchanturia
et al., 2007). The IGT tests decision making under ambiguity, and
requires learning the reward contingencies of the four decks
through trial and error. In the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, Damasio
and colleagues proposed that peripheral signals convey the emo-
tional value of choice options built up by past experience and
thereby guide ongoing decisions (Damasio, 1994). An unresolved
question is whether psychophysiological arousal is also sensitive to
the riskiness of a decision in conditions that do not require learning.
The small number of experiments that assessed peripheral arousal
during decision making under explicit risk suggests this might
indeed be the case: EDA and heart rate (HR) responses during risky
choice were found to vary as a function of the probability of
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winning/losing (Holper, ten Brincke, Wolf, & Murphy, 2014;
Studer & Clark, 2011) and the variance of outcomes (Holper, Wolf,
& Tobler, 2014; but see also Minati et al., 2012).
Another intriguing finding in previous research is that, like
choice behavior, peripheral reactivity during decision making
varies considerably across individuals (see Carter & Pasqualini,
2004; Crone et al., 2004; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & van
den Brink, 2006; Guillaume et al., 2009). The identification of the
factors underlying this interindividual variance has clinical rele-
vance to mental health problems characterized by aberrant sensitiv-
ity to rewards, punishments, and uncertainty, including addictions
(Verdejo-Garcıa, Lawrence, & Clark, 2008; Voth et al., 2014; Yen,
Ko, Yen, Chen, & Chen, 2009) and anxiety disorders (Maner et al.,
2007; Tang, van den Bos, Andrade, & McClure, 2012). Previous
research has linked interindividual differences in risk-taking behav-
ior to a number of personality traits, most notably impulsivity
(Bayard, Raffard, & Gely-Nargeot, 2011; Christodoulou, Lewis,
Ploubidis, & Frangou, 2006; Dir, Coskunpinar, & Cyders, 2014;
Franken, van Strien, Nijs, & Muris, 2008; Sweitzer, Allen, & Kaut,
2008), reward sensitivity (Franken & Muris, 2005; Kim & Lee,
2011; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007), and punishment sensitivity (Kim &
Lee, 2011; Studer & Clark, 2011; Studer, Pedroni, & Rieskamp,
2013). Gender may also play a role: males show a small but reli-
able tendency to make more advantageous decisions than females
on the IGT (see meta-analysis by Cross, Copping, & Campbell,
2011), and an IGT neuroimaging study found gender differences in
brain activation patterns (Bolla, Eldreth, Matochik, & Cadet,
2004). However, to date, interindividual differences in peripheral
sensitivity during decision making have not been explored as a
function of gender.
The current study assessed EDA and HR responses during the
Roulette Betting Task (RBT; Studer, Apergis-Schoute, Robbins, &
Clark, 2012; Studer & Clark, 2011; Studer, Manes, Humphreys,
Robbins, & Clark, 2015). In this task, participants are presented
with risky gambles and decide how much they want to bet on
them. Across trials, the explicitly stated chances of winning are
varied (40%, 60%, or 80%). To further isolate the decisional proc-
esses involved in bet selection, the task compares two choice con-
ditions. In the active-choice trials, the participant selects the bet
amount, whereas in the passive no-choice trials, the bet size is dic-
tated by the computer. We used hierarchical Bayesian analyses to
analyze peripheral responses during the selection phase of active
and passive decision making. Bayesian methods provide a number
of advantages over conventional null-hypothesis-significance test-
ing (NHST) with associated p values (Kruschke & Vanpaemel,
2015). Unlike NHST, the Bayesian approach allows estimating of
the actual probability of a research hypothesis. Bayesian analyses
also provide the full posterior probability distribution of the model
parameters of interest, make prior assumptions explicit, make
parameter correlations transparent, and provide a coherent frame-
work to model hierarchical data structures (Kruschke, 2011; Schei-
behenne & Pachur, 2015). Hierarchical Bayesian techniques
further account for varying degrees of measurement error on the
individual level and thereby improve estimation accuracy via a
mechanism referred to as borrowing strength (Gelman & Hill,
2007).
Our analyses focused on the selection phase of the task specifi-
cally. This period allows characterization of signals related to deci-
sion making per se (including processing and comparison of the
available choice options and actual selection). Whereas feedback-
related peripheral responses (i.e., responses to wins and losses)
have been extensively characterized in prior research (see, e.g.,
Crone et al., 2004; Lole, Gonsalvez, Barry, & Blaszczynski, 2014;
Lole, Gonsalvez, Blaszczynski, & Clarke, 2012; Stankovic,
Fairchild, Aitken, & Clark, 2014; Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, &
Brand, 2008; Wilkes, Gonsalvez, & Blaszczynski, 2010), few pre-
vious experiments have examined selection-related peripheral sig-
nals under conditions of explicit risk. In our first analysis, we
tested whether three peripheral indices (EDA, HR deceleration, and
HR acceleration responses) were sensitive to the probability of
winning/losing during bet selection, and whether these responses
were moderated by the choice condition (active vs. passive). We
predicted that peripheral responses would be more sensitive to the
chances of winning during active selection than computer-dictated
bet selection.
Second, we tested whether interindividual differences in this
peripheral sensitivity to the chances of winning were explained by
trait impulsivity, reward sensitivity, and punishment sensitivity
(measured by established personality questionnaires), and whether
peripheral sensitivity during risky decision making varied as a
function of gender.
Our final aim was to assess whether peripheral arousal can help
understand intraindividual variability in choice behavior. When
confronted with the same choice situation multiple times, a deci-
sion maker will not always select the same option (see, e.g.,
Camerer, 1989; Hey, 2001; Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). In some sit-
uations, varying one’s behavior might be adaptive, for instance,
during a chess or poker game against a skilled opponent. In tasks
such as the IGT where reward contingencies are learned through
trial and error, sampling and exploration of the different choice
options is even necessary. However, in situations where these
reward contingencies are provided explicitly, such instability in
choice is harder to explain. In line with several influential decision
theories postulating that emotional arousal can serve as an input
signal in decision making—including the Somatic Marker Hypoth-
esis (Damasio, 1994, 1996), Risk as Feelings (Loewenstein,
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), Decision Affect Theory (Mellers,
Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGre-
gor, 2007), and Affect as Information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983,
2003)—we hypothesized that fluctuations in peripheral arousal
may constitute one source of this intraindividual variability in
choice behavior. Thus, we tested whether trial-by-trial EDA and
HR responses on the active-choice trials predicted (residual) var-
iance in individuals’ betting decisions that was not explained by
the chances of winning.
Method
Participants
Sixty-eight healthy university students (25 males, 43 females,
Mage5 25 years, SDage5 3.5 years) who had no history of psychi-
atric disorders and were fluent English speakers took part in this
study. All participants were screened with the Problem Gambling
Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001) to exclude volunteers with
gambling problems.
Procedure
Participants attended a single testing session lasting approximately
60 min, in which they first completed the questionnaires, followed
by the setup of the psychophysiological monitoring and perform-
ance of the RBT. Participants gave written informed consent. The
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study was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants received
a financial reimbursement that was partially determined by their
final score on the RBT, to ensure that decisions on the task had
direct financial relevance to the participant. Specifically, partici-
pants received £5 for certain plus a task-dependent bonus that var-
ied between £0 and £5.
Questionnaire Measures
Participants were administered the BIS/BAS scale (Carver &
White, 1994) and the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Version 11; Pat-
ton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). The BIS/BAS scale contains 24
items and measures trait sensitivity of two motivation systems, the
behavioral activation system (BAS) and the behavioral inhibition
system (BIS), which are postulated to drive affective responses to
the anticipation and occurrence of rewards and punishment, respec-
tively (cf. Gray, 1972, 1981). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale con-
sists of 30 items that measure three subdimensions of impulsivity:
nonplanning impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness, and attentional
impulsiveness. Our analyses focused on nonplanning impulsivity,
defined as the tendency to make rash decisions without much fore-
thought or planning (Patton et al., 1995), which is the most relevant
subdimension for decision-making behavior (see Christodoulou
et al., 2006; Malloy-Diniz, Fuentes, Leite, Correa, & Bechara,
2007).
Experimental Task
The RBT (Studer et al., 2012; Studer & Clark, 2011) was pro-
grammed in Visual Basic 2008 (Microsoft Corp., Redmond, WA)
and administered on a laptop PC with keyboard control. In this
task, the participant bets on roulette-type gambles. In each trial, a
wheel containing 10 blue and red segments was presented. Below
the wheel, three bet boxes were visible (see Figure 1). The ratio
of blue to red segments represented the chances of winning. Blue
segments were designated winning segments, and red were losing
segments. Across trials, two parameters were varied: the chances
of winning (three levels: probability of winning versus
losing5 40% vs. 60%, 60% vs. 40%, or 80% vs. 20%) and the
choice condition (two levels: active-choice [A] vs. no-choice
[N]). The task thus contained six trial types, henceforth labeled
A40%, A60%, A80%, N40%, N60%, N80% (with the percentage num-
ber indicating the probability of winning). In the active-choice tri-
als, the bet boxes presented three options (10, 50, or 90 points),
and the participant selected their bet amount. In the no-choice tri-
als, the three boxes contained identical amounts. Thus, in both
conditions, the participant was required to make a (self-paced)
key press to select one of the three bet boxes, ensuring that motor
requirements were matched and only the active-choice trials
required a risk-sensitive bet decision. Once a response was made,
the wheel spun for a variable duration (7–8.5 s) and then stopped
on a segment. If the wheel stopped on a blue segment, the bet
was won, and the outcome message “YOU WON [XX] POINTS”
was presented. If the wheel stopped on red, the bet was lost, and
the message “YOU LOST [XX] POINTS” appeared. At the end
of each trial, a fixation cross was displayed for a variable inter-
trial interval (8–10 s), to allow recovery of physiological
responses.
Participants completed a total of 90 trials (15 trials of each
type), divided into three blocks. At the end of each block, the accu-
mulated score was presented.
In addition to being informed about these task rules, participants
were instructed to try to win as many points on the task as possible,
and were told that their accumulated total score would determine a
bonus payment based on a conversion chart.
Figure 1. Roulette Betting Task. Each trial consisted of three phases: (1) selection, in which the participant chose one of three bet boxes, (2) anticipa-
tion, in which the wheel was spun, and (3) feedback, in which the decision outcome was presented. In active-choice trials, participants were presented
with three different bet options, while in no-choice trials all three bet boxes contained identical amounts (not shown). Psychophysiological responses
were modeled to the onset of the selection phase.
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Acquisition of Peripheral Data
A BIOPAC system (MP150, recording at 1,000 samples per sec-
ond; BIOPAC Systems, Inc., USA) with two amplifiers (ECG100C
module and GSR100C module) was used to measure EDA and
HR. Electrodes were attached prior to beginning the task, and 5
min of resting state activity were recorded to allow participants to
adapt to the recording equipment and for EDA levels to stabilize
(see Fowles et al., 1981). EDA was measured using two grounded
Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the distal phalange of the
index and middle fingers of the nondominant hand. Isotonic paste
(BIOPAC Gel 101) was used as the electrolyte. A low-pass filter of
1.0 Hz and a DC high-pass filter were applied to the EDA record-
ing, and the signal was transformed to micro-Siemens units. HR
was recorded using disposable Ag-AgCl electrocardiogram (ECG;
Vermed EL503) patches secured to the right dorsal forearm and
left ankle, and high-pass filtered at 0.05 Hz. The interbeat intervals
were calculated from deviations between the R waves and trans-
formed online to beats per minute (bpm). AcqKnowledge Software
(Version: 3.9.0, BIOPAC Systems, Inc.) was used to record and
event-mark the psychophysiological data.
Extraction of Peripheral Responses
EDA and HR responses were modeled to the presentation of the
wheel, and extracted for each trial. A 1-s window immediately pre-
ceding the wheel onset served as a trial-by-trial baseline. EDA
responses were calculated as the maximum value in the time win-
dow 2–7 s after wheel onset minus baseline (Dawson, Schell, &
Filion, 2007). HR responses to motivational stimuli are typically
multiphasic, with an initial HR deceleration within 1–3 s and a sub-
sequent rebound acceleration (see Bradley, 2000, 2009; Bradley &
Lang, 2007; Graham & Clifton, 1966; Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985,
for reviews). Therefore, for each trial, two HR measures were
extracted: HR deceleration, defined as the minimum value in the
time window 0–3 s after wheel onset minus baseline, and HR
acceleration, defined as the maximum value in the time window 2–
6 s after wheel onset minus baseline. Thus, for HR deceleration,
greater negative peak values indicated larger responses, whereas
for HR acceleration and EDA, greater positive peak values indi-
cated larger responses. The extracted trial-by-trial EDA and HR
responses were then standardized (z-scored) for each participant,1
to enable comparisons across the peripheral indices. Four partici-
pants were excluded from EDA analysis due to technical problems
during data acquisition. Five participants were excluded from HR
analyses due to excessive noise in their ECG recording. Therefore,
final sample size for analyses of EDA and HR responses were
n5 64 and n5 63, respectively.
Statistical Analysis
Three sets of statistical analyses were conducted on the psychophy-
siological responses. In a first step, we tested whether peripheral
responses were sensitive to the choice condition and chances of
winning, using Bayesian analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for
within-subject data, as proposed by Kruschke (2010) and Kery
(2010). This method yields posterior probability distributions for
the peripheral responses in each of the six trial types (3 Chances of
Winning 3 2 Choice Condition). Pairwise contrasts of these distri-
butions were then calculated to investigate effects of interest. Since
we hypothesized that sensitivity to the probability of winning/los-
ing should be greater in the active-choice condition, our primary
effect of interest was the interaction between the choice condition
and the chances of winning. Within our model, this effect was
tested by comparing the difference between responses in trials with
a high (80%) versus with a low (40%) probability of winning
across the two choice conditions (i.e., A80%2A40% versus
N80%2N40%). To test for gender differences, we also calculated
separate Bayesian ANOVAs for male and female participants, and
then compared the posterior estimated peripheral responses.
A second analysis tested whether interindividual differences in
peripheral sensitivity to the chances of winning could be predicted
by the trait measures. Based on the results of the first analyses,
EDA and HR acceleration responses in the active-choice trials
were investigated. The reactivity measures were formalized as the
difference between the standardized response in A80% trials and in
A40% trials, with a larger difference indicating that responses
increased more strongly with higher chances of winning. Bayesian
regression analyses with the three personality measures (Barratt
nonplanning impulsivity, BIS, and BAS) as predictors were then
calculated.
The final set of analyses investigated whether intraindividual
variability in betting choices could be explained by the trial-by-
trial levels of peripheral arousal during the selection period.
Specifically, a Bayesian analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
tested whether the magnitude of EDA and HR acceleration
responses predicted bet sizes on a trial-by-trial basis, after
accounting for the chances of winning and interindividual differ-
ences. In other words, this analysis assessed whether peripheral
arousal could help explain residual variation in an individual’s
betting choices that could not be accounted for by the likelihood
of winning.
Bayesian analyses yield posterior probability distributions for
all free parameters of the statistical models. To obtain these distri-
butions, we relied on Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) meth-
ods implemented in the software package JAGS (Plummer, 2013)
called from R (version 3.0.2, R Core Team). For each analysis, we
drew a total of 100,000 representative samples from the joint poste-
rior parameter distribution using four separate Markov chains.
Inspection of the autocorrelation and the mixing of the Markov
chains for the relevant model parameters indicated that the sam-
pling procedure was efficient and that samples were drawn from
the whole range of the posterior distribution. The Bayesian
approach further requires specification of prior probability distribu-
tions for each model parameter. Here, we specified priors that
allow for a wide range of plausible values. To ensure that our
choice of priors did not anticipate or promote the final results, we
conducted prior sensitivity checks (Vanpaemel, 2010): All results
were qualitatively unchanged when other priors were used. Sam-
pling efficiency for all estimated model parameters was appropriate
as indicated by the Gelman-Rubin statistic and the estimated effec-
tive sample size. Full details of the model specification, including a
description of the prior distributions and the actual computer codes
as well as sampling efficiency information for all model parame-
ters, can be obtained from http://scheibehenne.de/Appendix.Studer-
ScheibehenneClark.zip
For all analyses, we report posterior means and highest posterior
density intervals (HDP95). The HDP95 indicates the interval in
which 95% of the most probable values for an estimated compari-
son or parameter fall (sometimes also referred to as credible inter-
val). In the first set of analyses, responses in two experimental
1. Means and SDs of raw measures used in z transformation can be
found at http://scheibehenne.de/Appendix.StuderScheibehenneClark.zip
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conditions were deemed credibly different when the HPD95 of the
difference between the two conditions did not include zero. Equiv-
alently, predictors of interindividual and intraindividual differences
were deemed credible when the HPD95 for the corresponding beta
weight in the regression equation did not include zero. In the analy-
ses of inter- and intraindividual differences, we also provide Bayes-
ian R2 values, calculated based on the ratio between the variance of
the data and the variance of the residuals (Gelman & Pardoe,
2006).
Results
Behavioral Data
Prior to analyzing peripheral responses, we assessed betting behav-
ior (in active-choice trials) and response times. In active-choice tri-
als, participants adjusted their bets to the chances of winning,
placing higher bets at more favorable odds (see Figure 2A). A
Bayesian ANOVA for within-subject data confirmed that bet
amounts were credibly different between the three levels of odds:
The estimated mean difference between A60% and A40% was 35
points, HPD95 [30 points, 39 points]; the estimated mean difference
between A80% and A60% was 24 points, HPD95 [19 points, 29
points].
A 2 3 3 Bayesian ANOVA of response times revealed a credi-
ble interaction effect between the choice condition and the chances
of winning (see Figure 2B): Response times decreased with
increasing chances of winning in both choice conditions, and this
modulation of response times by the chances of winning was credi-
bly stronger in active-choice compared to no-choice trials,
A80%2A40%5 1,100 ms, N80%2N40%5 424 ms, difference5
686 ms, HPD95 of difference [298 ms, 1,080 ms]. There was a
further credible main effect of choice condition, with slower
responses on active-choice compared to no-choice trials.
Peripheral Sensitivity to the Chances of Winning
Next, we tested whether EDA, HR decelerations, and HR accelera-
tions during the selection phase were sensitive to the chances of
winning and the choice condition. A credible interaction effect of
Choice Condition 3 Chances of Winning was found for EDA (see
Figure 3A). In active-choice trials, EDA during the selection period
increased with higher chances of winning, whereas in the no-
choice trials, EDA decreased with higher chances of winning (see
Figure 3B).2
A similar pattern of results emerged for HR acceleration, for
which a credible interaction effect was also found (see Figure
3C). HR accelerations increased with the chances of winning in
active-choice trials, but were not sensitive to the chances of
winning in no-choice trials. Figure 3D displays the posterior
estimated HR acceleration response (standardized) for each trial
type.
For HR deceleration response, no credible interaction effect
was found (see Figure 3E). Rather, as can be seen from Figure 3F,
HR deceleration responses were similar across the six trial types,
indicating that HR deceleration was not sensitive to the chances of
winning or choice condition.
In summary, HR acceleration and EDA during active decision
making were sensitive to the chances of winning, particularly in
the active-choice condition.
Gender, Betting Behavior, and Peripheral Responses
Betting behavior did not differ credibly between male and female
participants: a comparison of posterior bet amounts (in active-
choice trials) found no reliable gender differences (see Figure 4A).
Patterns of peripheral responding were also highly similar in
female and male participants: Comparisons of the posterior mean
peripheral responses in each of the six experimental conditions
found no credible gender differences for any of the three peripheral
indices (see online supporting information Figure S1). A direct
comparison of the Choice Condition 3 Chances of Winning inter-
action effect in female and male participants found no credible dif-
ference (see Figure 4B–D).
Figure 2. Behavioral responses. A: Participants adjusted their bets to the chances of winning in the active-choice trials. The posterior estimated aver-
age bet size for each level of the chances of winning are displayed. B: Decision latencies decreased with increasing chances of winning, and more so
in the active-choice condition. The middle panel displays the estimated response time for each of the six different trial types. The right panel shows
the sensitivity of response times to the chances of winning in the active-choice and no-choice conditions. Error bars represent the HPD95.
2. For some participants, the distribution of the peripheral measures
was slightly skewed. When rescaling the data by means of a logistic
transformation, the distributions were more symmetric and the results
became stronger. However, for ease of interpretation, we report all
results based on the original (z-scored) data.
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Personality Predictors of Psychophysiological Reactivity
During Decision Making
Descriptive statistics for the three personality measures (BIS scale,
BAS scale, Barratt nonplanning impulsivity subscale) are presented
in Table 1. Sample means and range were comparable to those
found in previous healthy samples (e.g., Carver & White, 1994;
Penolazzi, Leone, & Russo, 2013; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007), and
scores were approximately normally distributed. Internal consis-
tency was high for each scale, Cronbach’s a5 .75 for nonplanning
impulsivity, a5 .79 for BIS, a5 .81 for BAS.
Bayesian regression analyses tested whether individual differen-
ces in the sensitivity of EDA and HR acceleration responses (quan-
tified as the mean posterior response in A80% trials2 in A40%
trials) were predicted by these trait measures. For HR accelerations,
BIS score was a credible predictor, b5 .047, HPD95 [.012, .082],
Figure 3. Sensitivity of peripheral responses to the chances of winning. Selection-related EDA and HR accelerations, but not HR decelerations,
reacted differentially to the chances of winning in the active-choice versus no-choice condition. The top panels display the sensitivity of EDA (A),
HR acceleration (C), and HR deceleration (E) responses to the chances of winning in active-choice and no-choice trials. The bottom panels show the
posterior estimated responses (standardized) for each of the six different trial types (B—EDA, D—HR acceleration responses, F—HR deceleration
responses). Note that polarity of the y axis in the panels depicting HR decelerations (E and F) is reversed, as for HR decelerations stronger responses
are represented in more negative values. Error bars represent the HPD95.
Figure 4. Comparison of betting and peripheral responses in male versus female participants. A: Posterior estimated bet amounts in male and female
participants. B, C: Estimated sensitivity of EDA, HR acceleration, and HR deceleration responses to the chances of winning in active-choice and no-
choice trials, estimated separately for male and female participants. Neither betting behavior nor peripheral sensitivities differed credibly between the
gender subgroups. Error bars represent the HPD95.
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p(b< 0)5 .005: in participants with a high BIS score, HR acceler-
ation responses were more sensitive to the chances of winning (see
Figure 5). The BAS was also a credible (inverse) predictor of HR
acceleration responsiveness, b52.03, HPD95 [2.05, 2.001],
p(b> 0)5 .02: participants with low trait sensitivity to reward
showed higher cardiac sensitivity to the chances of winning (see
Figure 6). Together, these two trait predictors explained 8% of the
interindividual variance in HR acceleration responsiveness, r2 of
combined regression model5 .08. Nonplanning impulsivity did not
credibly predict HR acceleration reactivity. For EDA, no credible
trait predictors were found.
Predicting Bet Size from Peripheral Arousal
In a final step, we assessed whether variation in HR acceleration
and EDA responses could explain intraindividual differences in
betting. A Bayesian ANCOVA tested whether the trial-by-trial
magnitude of the peripheral responses predicted variation in the bet
amounts, above and beyond the chances of winning. A credible—
albeit small—effect of the trial-by-trial EDA upon (standardized)
bet sizes was found, with bet amounts increasing with the magni-
tude of the EDA response. The mean posterior probability estimate
for the corresponding beta weight was .04, HPD95 [.019, .066],
p(b< 0)5 .0003, r2 change5 .02, and the r2 of the full model
(including three predictors: the chances of winning, a random term
accounting for interindividual differences, and the standardized
trial-by-trial EDA response) was .66. The analysis of HR accelera-
tions revealed a similar increase of bet sizes with stronger HR
responses, b5 .03; HPD95 [.0052, .057], p(b< 0)5 .0098, r
2
change5 .03, and the r2 of the full model was .65. Thus, trial-by-
trial HR accelerations and EDA responses were credible predictors
of intraindividual betting behavior.
Discussion
In the current study, we assessed peripheral responses during the
RBT, a measure of decision making under explicit risk. Our data
revealed three main findings. First, EDA and HR accelerations dur-
ing the selection period were sensitive to the chances of winning,
and particularly so in the active-choice trials. Second, interindivid-
ual heterogeneity in peripheral reactivity could be linked to scores
on the BIS and BAS scales: Higher trait sensitivity to punishment
(BIS) and lower trait sensitivity to reward (BAS) were associated
with greater cardiac sensitivity to the likelihood of winning. Third,
trial-by-trial fluctuations in EDA and HR acceleration responses
explained a (small) portion of intraindividual variability in betting.
The results of the present study provide new insights into psy-
chophysiological responses during decision making under risk.
EDA and HR accelerations during active bet selection were sensi-
tive to the chances of winning. Previous research using the IGT
showed that peripheral arousal is sensitive to the reward/punish-
ment contingencies of decision options under ambiguity (e.g.,
Figure 5. Trait sensitivity to punishment predicts peripheral sensitivity
to odds. Self-reported trait sensitivity to punishment predicted HR accel-
eration reactivity to the chances of winning during active bet selection.
(Standardized) HR acceleration responses of participants with higher
BIS scores differed more strongly between trials with high versus low
chances of winning.
Figure 6. Trait sensitivity to reward negatively predicts peripheral sensi-
tivity to odds. Self-reported trait sensitivity to reward inversely pre-
dicted HR acceleration reactivity to the chances of winning.
(Standardized) HR acceleration responses of participants with lower
scores on the BAS were more strongly modulated by the chances of
winning during active bet selection.
Table 1. Personality Measures
Pooled sample (n5 67) Male (n5 25) Female (n5 42) Bayesian comparison
Measure M SD Range M SD M SD Difference HPD95
Nonplanning
impulsivity
22.0 5.1 13–35 22.0 4.1 22.1 5.6 .11 [-2.34, 2.63]
BIS 21.1 3.6 10–27 19.9 3.2 21.8 3.7 22.01 [23.82, 2.28]
BAS 39.5 5.3 22–50 39.6 5.0 39.4 5.5 .14 [22.50, 2.79]
Note. One participant did not complete the personality questionnaires, thus the final sample size was n5 67. Bold indicates a credible difference
between female and male subsamples.
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Bechara et al., 1997, 1999; Crone et al., 2004; Tchanturia et al.,
2007; Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, & Caramazza, 2002). In contrast,
only a handful of prior studies investigated whether such peripheral
sensitivities also manifest during decision making under explicit
risk, where the reward contingencies are fully described and do not
need to be learned through trial and error. Convergent with our find-
ing that section-related EDA and HR accelerations are sensitive to
the chances of winning, a recent study by Holper, ten Brincke et al.
(2014) reported that EDA during the choice phase in a sequential
risk-taking task was modulated by the probability of ruin (i.e., of
losing). Two further studies tested the sensitivity of EDA to
expected value and outcome variance—both composite measures
that combine the probability and magnitude of potential gains and
losses—under conditions of explicit risk, and found that EDA dur-
ing the processing of choice options scaled positively with both of
these measures (Euteneuer et al., 2009; Holper, Wolf, & Tobler,
2014). We note that in our task expected value and (in active choice
trials) outcome variance correlated positively with the chances of
winning, and thus it is possible that EDA and HR accelerations
were driven by one of these composite scores rather than chances of
winning in itself. Together, all of these findings demonstrate that
psychophysiological responses are indeed sensitive to reward/pun-
ishment contingencies during decision making under explicit risk.
The aforementioned findings converge in demonstrating that
peripheral arousal is sensitive to reward/punishment probability,
expected value, and outcome variance during decision making
under both ambiguity and under explicit risk. However, some
inconsistencies exist across studies in both the directions of identi-
fied relationships and the specific peripheral components that dis-
play sensitivity. For instance, in the current study, EDA and HR
accelerations during active bet selection were larger when the chan-
ces of winning were high, whereas Holper, ten Brincke et al.
(2014) observed that EDA scaled positively with the probability of
losing and, in our earlier study (Studer & Clark 2011), neither of
these two peripheral signals was significantly associated with the
chances of winning. As a second example, while IGT studies often
report higher EDA during disadvantageous choices (which have
low expected value; see, e.g., Bechara et al., 1999; Carter & Pas-
qualini, 2004; Crone et al., 2004; Tchanturia et al., 2007), Holper,
Wolf, and Tobler (2014) found a positive association between
selection-related EDA and expected value under conditions of
explicit risk. Clearly, peripheral responses to these decision param-
eters can vary as a function of the details of the decision environ-
ment. In line with this explanation, Damasio et al. argued that the
same somatic marker that serves as a positive approach-signal in
one task environment can serve as a negative avoid-signal in
another task environment (Damasio, Bechara, & Damasio, 2002).
Another plausible explanation is that, in addition to the main deci-
sion variables, peripheral responses are modulated by other factors
and requirements of the individual tasks. For instance, Jones et al.
found that the relationship between HR acceleration and decelera-
tion responses to the presentation of risky gambles and expected
value was inverted under conditions with time pressure compared
to without time pressure (Jones, Minati, Harrison, Ward, & Critch-
ley, 2011). Our own previous effect observed on HR deceleration
also merits consideration. In our earlier study (Studer & Clark,
2011), HR decelerations during active bet selection were modu-
lated by the chances of winning—a finding that was not replicated
in the present study with a larger dataset. This divergence could be
explained by differences in task structure, as the current study
included a larger range in the chances of winning and some nega-
tive expectancy trials. Another conceivable explanation is that
these discrepancies are due to the noisy nature of HR deceleration.
Of the three assessed peripheral measures, HR decelerations were
the least consistent across the task, indicating low reliability (see
Supporting Information for details). In the absence of other data on
HR decelerations in the context of decision making under risk, it is
difficult to determine which of these two explanations is more
likely, and further studies are needed to examine if and in which
circumstances rapid cardiac deceleration responses play a role in
decision making under risk.
In our personality analyses, interindividual differences in HR
acceleration sensitivity to the chances of winning during active deci-
sion making were linked to trait sensitivity to reward and punish-
ment, as measured by the BIS/BAS scale. For BIS scores, we found
a positive correlation with HR acceleration sensitivity. That is to say,
HR acceleration responses during bet selection differed more
strongly between trials with high versus low chances of winning in
individuals with higher BIS scores. This finding is consistent with
previously identified relationships between the BIS and decision
making: Individuals with high BIS scores take fewer risks on eco-
nomic decision-making tasks (Kim & Lee, 2011; Studer et al., 2013)
and modulate their betting behavior more strongly in response to
varying chances of winning/losing (Studer & Clark, 2011) than indi-
viduals with low BIS scores. Similarly, high neuroticism and high
anxiety, both BIS-related personality traits, have been associated
with better IGT performance (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Werner,
Duschek, & Schandry, 2009). Using EEG, Leue, Chavanon, Wacker,
and Stemmler (2009) observed that participants with high BIS scores
showed larger N2 amplitudes—an electrophysiological marker of
decision conflict monitoring—during a risky choice task compared
to participants with low BIS scores. Together with our current
results, these findings indicate that participants with high BIS scores
are more sensitive to factors such as decision risk, decision uncer-
tainty, and the chances of winning versus losing, both in their behav-
ior as well as in their physiological responding.
For BAS scores, a negative correlation with cardiac sensitivity
was found in the current study: HR acceleration during bet selec-
tion differed more strongly between trials with high versus low
chances of winning in participants with lower BAS scores. This
result is consistent with previous data on the IGT, where low BAS
scores have repeatedly been associated with superior task perform-
ance (Buelow & Suhr, 2013; Goudriaan et al., 2006; Penolazzi
et al., 2013; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). Together, these findings sug-
gest that participants with high BAS scores (i.e., high trait sensitiv-
ity to reward) are less sensitive to the likelihood of winning versus
losing, both in their decision behavior as well as in their peripheral/
somatic responses. Indeed, convergent with our results, two previ-
ous small sample studies found negative association between BAS-
related personality traits and peripheral sensitivity on the IGT. Mar-
daga and Hanseene (2012) reported that EDA during card selection
on the IGT was more sensitive to the punishment frequency of the
different decks in participants with low novelty seeking—a BAS-
related trait—compared to participants with high novelty seeking.
Meanwhile, Goudriaan et al. (2006) found that HR decelerations
immediately prior to response button presses distinguished more
strongly between advantageous and disadvantageous deck choices
in participants with lower BAS scores. While these studies consis-
tently show low BAS scores to be associated with increased periph-
eral sensitivities during decision making, the specific peripheral
marker is not fully consistent and may reflect sympathetic versus
parasympathetic contributions (Bradley, 2009; Bradley & Lang,
2007; Dawson et al., 2007; Graham & Clifton, 1966).
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In addition to personality, we also tested whether gender influ-
enced betting behavior and peripheral responses during decision
making. We found no support for gender as a moderator. Past work
using the IGT has described some gender differences in perform-
ance (see Cross et al., 2011; van den Bos, Homberg, & de Visser,
2013), which have been corroborated in a neuroimaging study
(Bolla et al., 2004). However, for decision making under explicit
risk, gender effects seem less robust: In past studies, overall levels
of risk taking did not differ between female and male participants,
and gender only influenced choice behavior in specific situations,
such as in the trial immediately following a loss (Deakin, Aitken,
Robbins, & Sahakian, 2004; Lee, Chan, Leung, Fox, & Gao, 2009;
Starcke et al., 2008). Taken together, these results suggest gender
might play a larger role in decision making under ambiguity than
under conditions of known uncertainty.
The third finding of our study was that the trial-by-trial magni-
tudes of HR accelerations and EDA during the selection phase
(active-choice trials) served as predictors of bet size, although we
note that each of these measures explained only a small part of the
variance in betting. In our previous study, we demonstrated that
averaged selection-related HR acceleration and EDA (uncontrolled
for the chances of winning) covaried with (average) bet sizes in the
active-choice condition (Studer & Clark, 2011). The Bayesian
ANCOVA used in the current study extended this earlier result to
trial-by-trial relationships and controlled for the chances of win-
ning; thus, it showed that peripheral arousal could help explain
some residual intraindividual variation in betting decisions. The
fact that people often vary their responses when presented with the
same decision multiple times has been established in previous
research (e.g., Camerer, 1989; Hey, 2001; Mosteller & Nogee,
1951), and this observation has led to the formulation of probabilis-
tic models of choice (for an overview, see Blavatskyy, 2011).
These models describe that an individual’s choices will be subject
to variability; however, they usually do not explain what causes
this variability. Our study suggests fluctuations in peripheral
arousal as one source of this intraindividual choice variability.
Fluctuations in peripheral activity could conceivably be brought on
by incidental emotions. Studies examining mood induction effects
on decision making (Cryder, Lerner, Gross, & Dahl, 2008; Gray,
1999; Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Lerner & Keltner, 2001) pro-
vide some tentative support for this proposition, and future research
might test it directly by assessing whether experimental manipula-
tion of peripheral activity—for example, pharmacologically
(Sokol-Hessner et al., 2015) or through subliminal emotional pri-
ming—systematically alter decision behavior. Another plausible
explanation is that fluctuations in peripheral arousal during the
selection period reflect subtle differences in the emotional valua-
tion of the decision options at hand. For instance, the subjective
valuation of a given set of choice options might be influenced by
recent outcome history. Speaking somewhat against this proposi-
tion is the observation that intraindividual variability in choice
behavior exists even when no outcomes are presented (Venkatra-
man, Payne, Bettman, Luce, & Huettel, 2009). Nonetheless, it is
conceivable that such effects do occur when decision outcomes are
experienced. Therefore, future studies might aim to formally test
this proposition by using decision paradigms that are optimized for
the testing of n11 effects upon peripheral arousal.
Conclusions
The results of the present study confirm that peripheral arousal is
sensitive to the riskiness of decisions even when reward contingen-
cies are explicitly described and no learning is required. Further, a
small portion of intraindividual variation in risky choice behavior
could be related to variation in peripheral arousal, suggesting that
fluctuations in peripheral arousal might be one source of intraindi-
vidual differences in decision-making behavior. Finally, we found
that interindividual heterogeneity in psychophysiological sensitiv-
ity to risk taking can be partially explained by trait sensitivity to
punishment and trait sensitivity to reward.
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